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China Incorporated: Property Rights, Privatisation, and the Emergence of a Private 
Business Sector in China 
 
By Barbara Krug, Rotterdam and Hans Hendrischke, Sydney 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The development of entrepreneurship and a private business sector in China pose various 
challenges to analysis. On the one hand, neo-classically based New Institutional 
Economics aims to find evidence that long-term investment and long-term commitment 
in and around firms can not be expected without deeply entrenched and state guaranteed 
private property rights. On the other hand, empirical studies within the China field 
concentrate on the political processes, in particular the interaction between the central 
state and local governments, at the danger of neglecting market forces, economic 
interests, and economic problems at stake1. The empirical study on which the following is 
based2 took a different path by using a set of framing assumptions. 
 
Firstly, it is assumed that in the course of the economic reforms firms became crucial 
from as early as 1983/84. It is as much the interaction – competition or cooperation – 
between firms as the interaction amongst all firms and their political environment that 
shapes the emergence and development of the private business sector. 
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Secondly, the official Chinese typology of enterprises will not be used. Instead the 
economic concept will be employed which defines ownership and autonomy according to 
risk taking and claim to residual income. 
 
Thirdly, official statements regarding enterprise development and the role of 
administration are used only after they could be verified through interviews with 
enterprises. 
 
Finally, the empirical study, based mainly on interviews in Zhejiang province in 2000/01, 
does not claim validity for its findings beyond the provincial borders. Provincial 
politicians, if not lower level (county, village) leaders enjoy considerable discretion in 
implementing reforms. Thus, different forms of private entrepreneurship can reflect 
different forms of implementation. Yet, such differences can also reflect different local 
cultures and development trajectories within China. It is for this reason that the research 
agenda of which the following is a part aims at a comparative analysis of four or five 
provinces3. 
 
Subsequently, the general question about Chinese entrepreneurship becomes localised in 
“What did Zhejiang province do to facilitate private entrepreneurship, the working of 
competition, and what ultimately turned the province into a success story?” The paper 
will proceed as follows. After the description of the political process that accompanied 
the development of the private business sector (Section II), some empirical findings will 
be presented in the form of “cases” that illustrate the emergence of different forms of 
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firms, more specifically, why the family firm disappeared, how collective enterprises (via 
management buy-outs) were privatised or corporatised; and how (official) stake holders 
became shareholders (Section III). 
 
Some tentative interpretations of the problems of family firms within the network-
capitalism of China will be offered (Section IV).  In the final part (Section V), the 
significance of networks will be elaborated. The conclusion will put forward some 
general thoughts on the use and importance of the empirical findings presented in this 
study.  
 
 
II. The formation of property rights for private enterprises 4 
 
Zhejiang Province has played a leading role in the privatisation of enterprises since the 
early 1980s when the ‘Wenzhou Model’ was first propagated5. Seen in hindsight, the 
‘Wenzhou Model’ was an early form of privatisation that was based on capital 
accumulation in a family and village environment of small and not professionally 
managed enterprises. Many respondents during the interviews mentioned that they went 
through a ‘Wenzhou phase’ in the 1980s. They associated this with under-capitalisation 
and the involvement of underqualified family members in the running of their enterprises.  
The first phase of professionalisation for these enterprises began in the late eighties with 
the promulgation of the standard regulations for shareholding (gufenzhi guifan tiaoli). 
The standard regulations were the first step in enabling enterprises to define property 
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rights and separate collective and private enterprise shares. The impact of these 
regulations was initially restricted by the economic recession of the years from 1989 to 
1991, which reduced business for many small enterprises or forced them to close down. 
The standard regulations were a national policy, which according to the interviews, was 
implemented at local level more in the form of recommendations to enterprises willing to 
participate in this transformation, rather than being enforced across the province as a 
compulsory measure. Shares defined by the standard regulations did not constitute legal 
titles for the owners. The ratio between private and collective shares allowable under 
these regulations was flexible and could lead to de facto privatisation, dependent on the 
local authorities. One of the respondents reported that in 1989 he was able to secure an 89 
per cent share in a collective enterprise that he had built up in the preceding years. 
Nevertheless, this enterprise retained its status as a collective until 1998, when it became 
incorporated as a limited liability company and the owner legalised his personal share 
while increasing it to 96.6 per cent. Other respondents in comparable situations reported 
that they had to wait for years before their local authorities allowed them to formalise 
their private shares, irrespective of the fact that their shares in their enterprises were 
recognised at an informal level in form of a ‘private’ contract with local authorities. 
 
During the next phase from 1992, enterprises were offered the chance to convert to a 
limited liability structure in anticipation of the Company Law which was still under 
consideration by the National People’s Congress in Beijing and only came into force in 
1994. This anticipation of the Company Law was in effect a further clarification of 
ownership structures aimed at separating collective and private shares. According to the 
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interviews the registration of shares under this policy did not have a legal basis, but was 
implemented by local authorities in preparation for the Company Law. Compliance with 
these new policies depended on local authorities, which could determine the number of 
enterprises participating as well as the maximum ratio of private shares. Private shares 
could be quite high.  
 
When the Company Law was promulgated in 1994, provincial and local authorities 
supported its implementation as a province-wide policy. In Zhejiang, the separation of 
collective or state-owned and private shares under the new law happened faster than for 
example in Shanghai or Beijing. Respondents reported that local authorities, for example, 
requested enterprises under their jurisdiction to convert to limited liability companies 
without, however, enforcing any strict limits on the volume of private or public shares. 
Until the end of the 1990s, enterprises were left to decide how to divide shares between 
different forms of owners. While improving property rights, incorporation under the 
Company Law did not necessarily lead to privatisation in the sense of guaranteeing a 
majority for private shareholders. The enforcement of the incorporation under the 
Company Law differed locally. Respondents in one of the localities visited stated that 
while their local government supported incorporation, private shares in their locality were 
generally not allowed to exceed 35 per cent. Yet, it is noteworthy that with the 
implementation of the Company Law, the firm as a legal person became the owner of the 
firm’s assets6. 
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A further move towards privatisation and confirmation of private property rights was 
made in 2000, when provincial authorities propagated a ‘deepened system reform’ 
(shenhua gaizhi) for the years 2000 and 2001. This reform aimed at reducing all public 
enterprise shares to less than 50 per cent, effectively giving private entrepreneurs a 
majority share in local enterprises. At the time of the interviews, the related reforms had 
not been concluded. In one locality, they involved a number of smaller enterprises 
already operating as quasi private enterprises, although their managers’ shares were still 
kept at a maximum of 35 per cent by the local government. All these enterprises had 
drawn up transition plans, which generally prescribed a probation period of one year for 
the top managers who upon successful completion would gain a majority share in their 
enterprise.  
 
The active implementation of the Company Law was only one aspect of the support 
extended to private enterprises by local state institutions which guided their transition to 
privatisation. In addition, the province encouraged local institutions to extend legal 
security to other areas of government activity. One example mentioned by respondents 
concerned new regulations for the sale of public land introduced in 1999. Public land had 
been under the control of local governments or village communities which had used the 
sale of land, or more precisely, the sale of long-term usage rights, as a way of 
accumulating capital for setting up local enterprises. Collective enterprises with no access 
to bank finance often relied on this method exclusively. During the nineties, this became 
an impediment for the development of private enterprises, as local communities tried to 
maximise their cash revenues from land sales at the cost of expanding private enterprises 
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in need of new industrial sites. In 1999, a general restriction was introduced when all land 
sales by communities had to be conducted through public bidding under the supervision 
of local land administration authorities (tudi guanli ju). 
 
General legal protection of private enterprises was also improved through protecting 
them from corrupt officials. Again, local regulations were issued that threatened officials 
of administrations in charge of private enterprises with penalties or dismissal if they were 
repeatedly found enjoying banquets or other invitations by the same enterprises. The 
official hold on a firm’s cash flow was better monitored; to redirect cash for financing 
bureaucratic consumption was punished7. 
  
In short, while private property rights became officially acknowledged when firms 
became legal persons, local authorities honoured property rights even before private 
shares became legally binding entitlements. Likewise, local authorities could implement 
land and real estate markets by which land, formerly controlled by the state or 
communities, was turned into a transferable asset. 
  
The Zhejiang example shows that local administrations can guide and support the 
establishment and protection of property rights for private entrepreneurs without the 
active corporate involvement of local officials that has given rise to the notion of local 
state corporatism. To understand this process, it is necessary to turn to the entrepreneurs 
themselves and the way they take up the economic opportunities created in this transition 
process.  
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III. From usage rights to corporate assets 
 
One unexpected observation in this context was the exclusion of family members from 
shareholding and management, as established knowledge about Chinese enterprises in 
Zhejiang in particular and China in general would rather have indicated the opposite 
trend8. Admittedly, shareholding by family members during the establishment of 
enterprises was a common occurrence for many respondents. However, with the 
exception of smaller enterprises, such as restaurants, this does not suffice to define these 
enterprises as family enterprises. Firstly, in the case of all larger enterprises, capital 
contributions by family members were generally not made in the form of long-term 
equity capital, but rather on a short-term basis of two to three years and at interest rates of 
twice or three times the level of the going bank rate. As a source of enterprise finance, 
family members thus offered little advantage over business partners or friends. Another 
avenue for family members to become shareholders was through the requirement of the 
Company Law of a minimum number of two shareholders. Respondents agreed that these 
positions would generally be filled with trustworthy members of the core families who, 
however, irrespective of their family status, would only receive minimum shares to 
ensure that they remained at arm’s length from enterprise management. In the view of 
respondents, the involvement of family members always implied the risk that they might 
demand a say in the management of the enterprise on the basis of their capital 
contribution. Consider the following example: 
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Case 1: The family business. 
The Garden of Manifold Pleasures is one of those new Limited Liability Corporations 
whose directors and shareholders feel slightly overwhelmed by their new titles and 
authority. In 1984, when Mr. Zhou Weiming and his wife were assigned a building and 
some surrounding space by the local street committee in Hangzhou Upper District 
(Shangchengqu), they had so little money that it did not even occur to them that they 
were dealing with something that might be called capital. The family’s cooking skills 
attracted customers and as their restaurant slowly grew, they were able to make some 
savings and invest in new equipment. The neighbourhood committee was not much 
interested in their commercial dealings as long as the Zhous created employment only for 
family members. This changed as Mr. Zhou slowly increased his staff from the original 
eight family members to 52 people recruited from the neighbourhood. The committee 
now provided more space and received payments from the restaurant. At the end of this 
process, Mr. Zhou acted as the owner, claiming net profit, while the neighbourhood 
committee received a nominal rent from the restaurant.  
 
When local policies required that the street committee enterprises be converted into 
Limited Liability Companies, Mr. Zhou solved the problem by asking his two sisters to 
become silent shareholders. Together they received a share of 30 per cent, while Mr. 
Zhou and his wife took a share of 60 per cent, thus fulfilling the requirement that 
corporations needed at least two shareholders. Mr. Zhou could have increased his 
majority to 70 per cent, but he felt it wise to include the street committee with a ten per 
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cent share. He made this offer to the Street Committee in view of its original contribution 
in form of land and the building and “in order to keep the good relations going”. Profit is 
distributed according to shares, while all major decisions are made by him (and his wife).  
 
Mr. Zhou is concerned about local competitors. They have an impact on his business and 
he has to keep an eye on them. Competition forces him to constantly upgrade his 
restaurant. He insists on relying on his personal savings for investment. The only instance 
when he used bank finance for an investment was when he bought a new Karaoke 
equipment. However, the relatively small sum was more than covered by the fixed-term 
deposit he kept in the same bank. Mr. Zhou does not think that he could go bankrupt, as 
long as the restaurant remains small and does not incur any debt. In the worst case he can 
“return to unemployment”. Any expansion would mean to use “outsiders”, i.e. people not 
known to him whom he would not trust.  
 
The important point to note here is that it was the Company Law that provided the 
incentive to ask family members to become shareowners in the incorporated firm. 
Respondents agreed that shareholder positions would generally be filled with trustworthy 
members of the core families who, irrespective of their family status, would only receive 
minimum shares and no management rights. The formal aspects alone, of family 
members having made some initial investment or accepted to function as silent 
shareholders, or even a low-level employee, do not fulfil the definite requirements for 
classification as family enterprise9. Some respondents explained that they had taken 
preventive measures to ensure that family members remained excluded from management 
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functions after their retirement. Their justification was that family members were 
generally not qualified for management tasks. The collective memory of the many failed 
family enterprises that had to be taken over by functioning enterprises during the 
recession of 1989 to 1991 in order to maintain employment might have served as a lesson 
for those entrepreneurs who survived the crisis. 
 
This indicates a special resource constraint family firms may face. Their ability to expand 
beyond the local community is less due to a lack of finances and connections (social 
capital), but rather to a lack of managerial skills within the family10. 
 
The importance of managerial skills is also manifested in frequent management buy-outs. 
Management buy-outs are a little documented form of privatisation in China which 
actually preceded the legalisation through the Company Law. Like other forms of 
privatisation, they often evolved from an informal contractual basis and subsequently 
utilised the Company Law for conversion to private ownership, as the example of Pump 
Factory Ltd. in Zhuji near Hangzhou shows.  
 
Case 2: Management Buy-out 
The general manager laid the foundations for Pump Factory Ltd. Soon after 1976 when at 
the age of 18 he started work as an apprentice at a small repair workshop for water pumps 
in his native village. In 1983 he headed the small collective enterprise, which by that time 
had nine workers producing spare parts for pumps. Their annual turn-over was several 
thousand Yuan. The small collective entered a boom period when local farming reverted 
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to households, and farmers began investing in small individual water pumps to replace 
the large village-owned pumps. Demand for these locally produced pumps was so strong 
that the workshop kept increasing production even during the recession years after 1989. 
Eventually, the village administration decided to liquidate its ownership rights of the 
highly profitable firm. 
  
In 1994, in preparation of incorporation under the Company Law, the asset value of the 
enterprise was estimated at 20 million Yuan and shares over this amount were offered to 
the workforce. The general manager originally intended to acquire a 51 per cent majority, 
but for political reasons had to settle for a 49 per cent share. He was required to make an 
initial cash payment of 2 million Yuan to the village and allowed to pay the remainder in 
instalments from his expected future profit share. His deputy paid in 500,000 Yuan and 
further six managers together 800,000 Yuan for smaller individual shares. The remaining 
shares were given to the workers and employees of the enterprise. In theory, these shares 
were transferable. Yet, as other interviews indicate, they were linked to the jobs and 
could even serve as a means to keep demands for pay rises at bay. The local government 
invested the proceeds from this buy-out in a new administration and market centre for 
their river pearl business, a cement plant and village infrastructure.  
Since 2000 political restrictions on maximum individual share have been lifted. The next 
planned step in the development of the enterprise is to list the company on the share 
market, without however, intending to float the manager’s share.  
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The points to note here are that one entrepreneurial manager together with seven 
colleagues pooled savings to buy a majority share from a village whose leadership was 
obviously more than willing to give up control over their “collective” assets. The trust in 
the managerial skill of the buyers and the general prospect of the firm were enough to 
allow the manager to claim forty-nine per cent of ownership shares for a sum equivalent 
to ten per cent of the registered capital. Even if his and his colleagues’ down payment can 
be interpreted as a collateral that enforced their commitment, the generous “buying-in” 
deal offered to him can also be seen as a rent that scarce managerial talent can demand 
and appropriate in the current economic environment. 
 
Once more, privatisation and the acknowledgement of property rights can be shown to be 
the outcome of local politics rather than of national legislation. This form of privatisation 
depends on social capital and networking between firms and local authorities. 
 
Social capital can instigate entrepreneurial activity that precedes the establishment of 
enterprises at a stage when property rights cannot even take effect. This social capital is 
generated within networks. The following case illustrates the flexible functioning of 
social capital in a network that led to the formation of a private company. In the end, this 
network venture included none of the original stakeholders, who had planned and set up 
the enterprise.  
 
Case 3: Setting up a firm through social capital 
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In the case of the Street Lighting Factory Ltd., the object of privatisation was not a 
tangible asset, but rather a business opportunity conceived by the original state-owned 
enterprise and the local Bureau of Industry and Commerce. They could have expanded 
their own existing structures for this purpose, but instead chose to privatise. For this 
purpose, they activated a network of contacts to find a potential private entrepreneur 
among their own ranks who would be able to organise the supply of high-tech 
components to China’s most advanced producer of street lighting. For the respondent this 
offered a chance to start his own company. Arguably, he faced considerable risk, because 
on offer was not a binding supplier’s contract, but simply the reasonable chance to enter a 
lucrative market, provided that he could meet challenges of new technologies, quality 
control and reliability. There was the chance that by using his old connections with the 
state-owned enterprise, he might develop business links with their joint venture partner, a 
major multinational corporation. 
 
The respondent decided to face the challenge. As a physics graduate of Shanghai’s Fudan 
University in the 1960s, he had had a model career as a technical cadre in his home city’s 
industrial administration in Zhejiang. Rising through the technical ranks, he had become 
factory director of a local specialised glass factory from 1982 to 1985. From there he had 
moved to the local industrial and commercial administration to take charge of general 
administration, personnel and enterprise administration. His career change to private 
entrepreneur came unexpectedly through his personal relations to the state-owned 
enterprise, a well-established producer of street lighting with a history of over eighty 
years. In the seventies, this enterprise had bought semi-finished products from the 
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respondent’s factory. In 1993, the state-owned enterprise required for its joint venture a 
supplier of mercury vapour street lighting components and contacted local industrial 
administrations and the respondent’s former factory in search for an entrepreneur who 
would be able to set up a new enterprise to look after this business opportunity. In the 
end, the choice fell on the respondent after his local industrial administration and former 
colleagues from his factory recommend him to set up a private company. 
 
The respondent required investment funding of 500,000 Yuan of which 400,000 Yuan 
were for equipment and 100,000 Yuan for running costs. He and his deputy, his former 
chief engineer from his time as a factory director, contributed 60,000 Yuan each for their 
individual shares of together thirteen per cent of the registered capital. Five smaller 
investors who were interested in employment with the company acquired another 
fourteen per cent. The bulk of sixty per cent came from a local private entrepreneur who 
had set up his own electrical goods company in 1988 and who interestingly enough 
claimed no position in the management. This ownership structure set up in 1993 has 
remained unchanged. With the exception of one, the small investors have left the 
company, but retained their shares. In 2000, the company registered as a Limited 
Liability Company, a move that prompted clarification of property rights. 
  
Today, the majority investor holds the position of Chairman of the Board of Directors. 
The Board discusses and decides all major issues, such as major investments, 
technological innovations, daughter companies and large bank loans by voting according 
to shares. While this gives crucial powers to the majority shareholder, the operational 
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side of the business is the sole responsibility of the respondent who is the general 
manager. The distribution of profit is unusual. Sixty per cent are re-invested; out of the 
remaining forty per cent the respondent as general manager receives half as his dividend. 
This exceeds by far the sum he would be entitled to on the ground of his thirteen per cent 
chare of registered capital. Again, this additional benefit needs to be seen as a premium 
for product ideas, managerial skills in perceiving business opportunities, and his ability to 
turn old contacts into business relations, as the following explanations given during the 
interview may show. 
 
During the start-up period the company actually did not receive any orders from the 
Shanghai Joint Venture. On an informal, personal basis the management was able to 
obtain technical information, which was relayed through a network of contacts of people 
who in the past had worked for the Joint Venture and maintained links with its technical 
staff. Initially, the new company only managed to sell to smaller domestic clients in 
Southern China and to some Middle Eastern countries. By 1995, the quality of their 
products had reached a level where the Shanghai-based Joint Venture finally accepted 
them as a supplier. From then on, their production expanded rapidly. By 2000, sixty per 
cent of their production was sold to the Shanghai Joint Venture. 
 
Relations with their Shanghai client have now become so close that the company is 
investing in new technologies in order to keep pace with technological innovations by the 
Shanghai client who provides technical know-how and information required for changes 
in products and quality. The joint effort led to new products that are expected to open the 
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South Korean market and further export opportunities. In 2000, the company obtained its 
first medium-term bank credit, to be paid back within three years, to finance the required 
investment in research and development.  
 
To note here is that this profitable private firm is based on a public-private network that 
originated in the former state sector11. The network in this example has a very specific 
function in providing input for which there was and still is not yet a market in China. 
Such non-tradable resources are not limited to state controlled input, but include venture 
capital, technical know-how, managerial talent and potential access to clients (or 
reputation).  
 
Furthermore, the case is remarkable for the interplay between the network and the 
institution of property rights. While participants of the network used their social capital to 
devise the new enterprise, they relied on institutional support, specifically the property 
rights provided under the Company Law, to create a spin-off that had its own corporate 
identity and operated under market conditions. 
 
A third noteworthy feature is that a group of investors or a network can establish private 
property rights by the way of incorporating companies.12 Regardless what the actual 
share in corporate (financial) capital, as long as there is a consensus of all stakeholders, 
and ownership claims are not disputed, they are able to establish private property rights. 
The investiture of the general manager as second major shareholder and major dividend 
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recipient once more indicate the extent to which managerial talent and social capital is 
rewarded in the present business environment of China. 
 
The apparent absence of family enterprises on the one hand and the ubiquity of networks 
and their obvious ability to take on functions that are generally assumed to be the 
prerogative of family networks on the other, make it tempting to speculate about 
functional links and transitions between the two. Before turning to this topic, let us first 
take a closer look at the entrepreneurial role of the family in a broader framework. 
 
 
IV. The family as a special form of network. 
 
While the existing literature on the structure of the Chinese firm strongly emphasises the 
role of the extended family in the establishment of new firms, as well as at the core of the 
private sector in general, the striking empirical result of surveys in Shanxi, Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu indicate that the notion of the extended family as the major basis for private 
enterprise will not survive extended empirical scrutiny13. This unexpected outcome from 
interviews in these provinces justifies a more detailed look at the data and the underlying 
variables. The tables below result from surveys in these three provinces.  
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Tab. 1: Ownership: Who owns the firm? (v15) 
 
Answer Frequency Percent 
 
respondent alone 18 25,4 
respondent's family 9 12,7 
respondent with less than 6 friends 13 18,3 
group of private investors 13 18,3 
mix of answers 1 – 4 3 4,2 
collective village 2 2,8 
mix of collective and 1 – 4 3 4,2 
state firm 9 12,7 
Confused 1 1,4 
Total 71 100,0 
 
At first sight, the data set seems to be dominated by firms established and managed by 
one individual: the Schumpeterian entrepreneur. The second largest group are firms 
established by friends. There is reason to add the category of private investors this group, 
as these were also friends or colleagues in most cases. Thus, responses to this general 
question suggest that entrepreneurship in China is built on networks of friendship rather 
than on family ties. 
 
One could argue that even if family ties were not evident in the establishment of the firm, 
they still might serve as a surrogate capital market in that the institution of the extended 
family allows to pool savings for one entrepreneurial family member to rely on. It was 
therefore specifically asked if the family functions as a source for accumulating the initial 
endowment of the firm. As Tab. 2 shows this was the case in only twenty seven per cent 
C:\ERS files\81 krug\VfS_draft rev 12-09-01_hh.doc  
  
20
of the cases. Again friends come in first, in particular in the 1980s and early 1990s when 
banks were not yet willing or able to lend to individuals. 
Tab. 2: Was the family a source of funds for capital assets (i.e. land, plant and 
machinery, etc.) when the firm was first set up? (v34) 
 
Answer Frequency Percent 
 
yes 19 27,1 
no 51 72,9 
Total 70 100,0 
 
While 47.8 per cent of respondents answered that family connections were not important 
for the success of a firm (v 115), the importance of friends is reflected in the next 
questions, which asked who the entrepreneur would turn to for support in case of 
economic problems. 
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Tab. 3: In the event of a serious problem or an emergency, which individuals or 
organisations would you expect to come to your help? 
 Answer Frequency Percent 
    
 Banks 36 52.9 
 1st mentioned 32 47.0 
 2nd mentioned 4 5.9 
   
 Friends 11 16.2 
 1st mentioned 6 8.8 
 2nd mentioned 5 7.4 
   
 Local government, Party, “state” 
 
5 7.4 
 1st mentioned 4 5.9 
 2nd mentioned 1 1.5 
   
 Industrial & commerce  associations 
 
2 2.9 
 Shareholders 2 2.9 
 No need 2 2.9 
 Nobody 2 2.9 
 Company in same sector 2 2.9 
 Mother company 2 2.9 
 Employees 2 2.9 
 Court 1 1.5 
 Family (Family members) 1 1.5 
   
 Total 68 100,0 
 
 
Finally, when asked about the general importance of the family for business success, the 
following answers shed a striking light on the demise of the (extended) family as an 
economic actor. Only five out of forty four agreed (or slightly agreed) with the statement 
“Family connections with a wide range of people are crucial to the success of the firm.” 
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Tab. 4:  Family connections with a wide range of people are crucial to the success of 
the firm. (v248) 
 
Answer Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
strongly disagree 10 27,8 27,8 
disagree 15 41,7 69,4 
slightly disagree 2 5,6 75,0 
not sure 4 11,1 86,1 
slightly agree 3 8,3 94,4 
strongly agree 2 5,6 100,0 
Total 36 100,0  
 
These empirical findings cannot easily be dismissed and should be seen as a challenge for 
further analysis. One obvious question in future studies would ask if the extended family 
as an entrepreneurial core has withered away in the People’s Republic of China, and if so, 
what caused this development. To claim that this is due to the global modernisation 
process and point to the examples of other countries misses the point, as studies on 
Overseas Chinese communities have convincingly proved that the Chinese form of loose 
ties within the extended family can smoothly adapt to a working market environment14. A 
socio-political argument might focus on the effects of the Cultural Revolution that left no 
family untouched. If as a general experience a large number of families have been split 
on political grounds, a drop in the general level of trust could be expected. Yet, the extent 
to which such a drop in the level of trust within families leads to other, substitute forms 
of co-ordination depends on available and known alternatives. As the empirical findings 
indicate, friendship seems to be a close enough surrogate for the extended family. When 
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asked to specify friendship links, the respondents named three groups: childhood friends, 
friends from the military service and friends from college or university. All three groups 
served as the focal point in forming networks. It is worth mentioning that Party 
membership might have been appreciated, yet was not a decisive factor in network 
formation.  
 
Opposed, or rather complementary, to this trust argument15 is an argument that focuses 
on the resource-base of the family. Even if extended family ties had survived the political 
and social changes during the first decades of the People’s Republic, the resource base of 
families after thirty years of Communist rule (preceded by decades of civil war) was 
certainly low when economic reforms started in the 1980s. The narrow resource base is 
not limited to financial capital but includes all forms of human and social capital. Thus, 
one of the strengths of the (old) extended family, namely that its access to a large pool of 
differing talents, education and personal relations, was lost16. Instead, friendship links 
built on army ties or university education offered comparatively better prospects, 
considering that universities and the army have been two of the few broad institutions 
outside the Party where people from all parts of the country and different backgrounds 
could meet. One of the major problems facing successful firms is how to expand from 
local origins into the national market. As the interviews indicate, this was an area where 
the reliance on friends who had returned to their home provinces proved much superior to 
relying on family members who most probably lived in the closer surrounding.  
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The comparative advantage of networks built on friendship and common interest will 
only work if the internal governance of the network shows similar or lower transaction 
costs than the governance of families in regards to acceptance of norms of reciprocity and 
acknowledgement of mutual obligations. As the interviews seem to confirm this, one 
could reverse the question and ask if the family should not be seen as a special form of 
network built on trust among a predefined group of members, albeit not to the exclusion 
of economic reasoning. This would deprive the family of its exclusivity and make it one 
network amongst others among which the entrepreneur has to make a choice.   
 
In China’s institutional environment, firms depend on networks for survival and 
expansion. These networks cannot be expected to disappear completely if and when 
functioning markets and legal process will have been established in the process of further 
marketisation. At the firm level the networks show up in the form of shareholding, cross-
shareholding or “holdings”. At the level of industries they manifest themselves (if they do 
not prefer to remain invisible17) as chambers of commerce, business associations, or 
simply groups of people sharing similar backgrounds.  
 
 
V. Some findings: Networks and Firms 
 
The establishment of private property rights in China has been an incremental process 
from the introduction of usage rights to the acknowledgement of individuals (natural 
persons) as owners of capital assets and from collective rights to the establishment of 
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firms that as legal persons own corporate assets. Rather than on national legislation, the 
speed of this process depends on local politics, that is, the operation of local networks. It 
seems too easy to point to one group, say, Communist Party cadres, the village or 
township, the Industrial and Commercial Bureau, let alone the family, as natural partners 
in the formation of networks. A more systematic analysis of the background of firms and 
the prevalence of state-private networks points to the economic value of networks.19 
Networks are formed and maintained via entry and exit of individuals. They provide 
firms with at least one of the following three ‘services’. 
 
(1) Both private property rights protection and contractual security are generally 
collective goods provided by local state agencies in charge of the enforcement of liability 
and contractual obligations. Weak state enforcement can be complemented by the internal 
enforcement mechanism of networks which have social sanctioning mechanisms, such as 
loss of reputation, “hostage” taking or ostracising individual members to their avail20. 
Uniquely for China, and in contrast to more generally known cases of patronage 
systems21, local state agencies can be part of networks in which they cooperate with other 
partners to establish private property rights. In this, they are undoubtedly helped by 
national legislation on which they can rely to legally sanction their actions, but the 
incorporation of companies needs to be approved and implemented at the local level in 
the first place. The required initiative and active participation by local government 
institutions in this process is secured through their participation in local networks.  
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To conclude from this that patronage networks would disappear once national law 
enforcement agencies will function better seems premature, however. Most networks do 
not limit their ‘range of services’ to protection but also offer access to non-tradeable 
input. 
 
The non-tradability of many resources is certainly one of the most severe constraints in 
the development of firms and the private business sector. It explains, for example, why 
Chinese firms operating in insecure environments do not go for vertical integration or 
product diversification, but instead expand via investment into unrelated lines of 
production. A resource to which a firm happens to have access needs to be put to best 
use, whether this use adds up to a business core or not, as costly intra-firm slack is to be 
avoided. The function of networks in such a case is to assist in a swap of idle or 
inefficiently used resources amongst its members. By doing so, the network can broker 
access too much needed assets, enlarging the resource base of its member firms22.  
 
In this case, too, we may conclude that better functioning markets, i.e. less state 
controlled input, will drive out networks. As likely as this is, in particular, if further 
marketisation is accompanied by better law enforcement, it does still not imply that 
networks will disappear.  
 
The reason is that non-transferability is not limited to state control. Other hard-to-transfer 
inputs include (tacit) knowledge, business routines, and learning; in short activities which 
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create positive externalities. In similar situations, Western market economies also 
respond by network formation, for which Silicon Valley is the best-known example. 
 
(3) As the real option approach in capital markets has shown it is worthwhile for 
firms to buy an option on assets, such as patents, before relative prices are generated in 
markets which then decide on the execution of such an option23. Such “fishing for 
opportunity” strategy is what networks do in the case of the private sector in China. Once 
profitability of the use of an asset is perceived, but cannot yet be calculated, networks get 
an option. By doing so, they create a pool of different options available to different 
entrepreneurs or firms. Seen in this light, networks serve as learning platforms that allow 
failure of individual firms, as each individual failure helps to improve the calculation of 
future outcomes and stabilise expectations. Unlike private firms, networks are able to 
exploit these possibilities, as the sunk costs involved in individual failure can be 
counterbalanced by the gain from acquiring investment-specific knowledge.  
 
All in all, these findings cannot come as a surprise to transaction costs economics. The 
use of the market in China is still a costly way for allocating resources and investing in 
new products or new sectors24. The results of the empirical study suggest that networks 
are less costly devices when it comes to better exploiting non-transferable input and 
exploring business or investment opportunities. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Once in a while it is worthwhile to ask ‘is the fact a fact’, even in a theory-driven field 
like economics. This implies that instead of testing existing theories or searching for 
supportive evidence to well-known assumptions, the research design needs to be 
explorative. Consequently, other techniques need to be employed in order to generate 
data on which new ‘models’ can be built. For example, as for our purpose the State 
Statistical Yearbook of the People’s Republic of China is a political document structured 
according to administrative classifications rather than a collection of data structured 
according to economic concepts, it is of limited use only. 
 
Empirical research in China needs to generate “raw data” that allow employing the 
analytical toolkit of modern economics. One device is to use interviews, questionnaires, 
and quantitative methods developed for analysing such data. Taking into account the time 
constraint most empirical research faces, such a procedure implies that the idea of dealing 
with large numbers and tools developed for this purpose has to be given up. In other 
words, economics has to move away from macroeconomics and econometrics toward 
other social sciences where such techniques are well established, like for example 
sociology and social psychology.  
 
The use of case studies poses another problem. If case studies are to offer more than 
anecdotes, they need to be structured along conceptual terms, which allow subsequent 
repetition of the research design. The research agenda of which the findings presented 
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here form a part distinguishes two periods and two techniques: There is first the pre-
sample period for which the relevant data were gathered through open interviews. For the 
sample itself, data are generated with the help of a standardised questionnaire. While the 
latter technique is well established in the social sciences, the former is rather new. 
Therefore, a short description seems to be appropriate.  
 
The interviews followed a method developed in Stanford for the analysis of the 
emergence and dissolution of firms and sectors (industrial districts, in Marshall’s 
terminology). It is called Event-History Design25 that aims at ‘information on the exact 
times and character of all demographic events experienced over the lifetime of the 
organization (firms) in the set’26. The sequencing of events matters, as does the definition 
of events in appropriate conceptual terms.  
 
In the empirical study introduced above, the events were entrepreneurship, i.e. the 
activities that precede the registration of a firm or the beginning of production, ownership 
and private property rights, diversification, and expansion beyond the local nexus27.  
 
The findings of the study suggest revising both the conventional view of China, and the 
conventional analytical procedures fore transition economies. The assumption of China 
as a homogenous culture is misleading, likewise the assumption that culturally 
determined behaviour dominates economic choice and decision-making. Chinese 
economic actors, too, employ an economic calculus. The quick dismissal of the notion of 
the family firm, which is seen as an inferior institution when compared to incorporated 
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firms linked by networks, offers one striking example. This is not to say, however, that 
culture does not play a role. The ability to establish and maintain networks built on trust, 
reciprocity, and mutual obligations, is another equally striking example. 
 
Moreover, the regional variations (or different ‘cultures’) within China might find their 
explanation in the different practices remembered and revived by locally entrenched 
networks and/or negotiated between firms and political authorities responsible for the 
implementation of reforms. As ample of empirical research has shown28, it is the local 
leadership rather than national legislation which determines the pace of implementation. 
When it comes to explaining the variations in economic behaviour or economic 
development, any empirical study faces the problem that on the one hand these variations 
reflect different local business practises as remembered or negotiated, and on the other 
hand the variations might reflect a different stages in the time path of the reforms. 
 
Whatever the cause in each single case, it is necessary to construct a more specific theory 
for transition economies that allows analysing the context in which the economic calculus 
dominates choice, and in which economic actors find it more promising to revive and 
employ other mechanism for individual choice, allocation and coordination.  
 
Finally, the findings suggest that one should beware of falling into the availability trap. 
To interpret or re-interpret China’s transition and economic development with the help of 
easily available general literature or statistics can be misleading. The opening up of China 
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has resulted in a rapidly increasing literature in specialised journals, which deserves 
attention. The literature on networks or family business illustrates the point.29  
 
This literature further suggests that analysis based on conceptual terms, i.e. taking China 
as a ‘case’, might offer additional and more fruitful insights than adopting the concept of  
‘Chineseness’ for an analysis that confirms available information and merely adds 
additional supportive evidence. 
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